SECTOR: SIGNALING

Security: SIP/IMS - Interface Deep-Dive

This document details the functional security objectives and vulnerabilities of critical IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) interfaces.

🔗 Critical Signaling Interfaces

1. Mw (P-CSCF ↔ S-CSCF)

  • Purpose: SIP registration and session control within the IMS core.
  • Key Messages: REGISTER, INVITE, SUBSCRIBE.
  • Security Objective: Ensure authenticity of proxy-to-server communication.
  • Tactical Vulnerability: Registration Hijacking. If the Mw interface is not protected by IPsec or TLS, an attacker can spoof 200 OK responses to intercept registrations.

2. Cx (CSCF ↔ HSS)

  • Purpose: Subscriber authentication and location management using Diameter or HTTP/2.
  • Key Messages: UAR/UAA (User-Authorization), MAR/MAA (Multimedia-Auth).
  • Security Objective: Protect subscriber credentials and profile data.
  • Tactical Vulnerability: Credential Leakage. Unauthorized MAR queries can expose authentication vectors (RAND/AUTN) to rogue nodes.

3. Sh (AS ↔ HSS)

  • Purpose: Allows Application Servers (AS) to access subscriber transparent and non-transparent data.
  • Key Messages: UDR/UDA (User-Data), PNR/PNA (Push-Notification).
  • Security Objective: Enforce strict access control for third-party application servers.
  • Tactical Vulnerability: Profile Mining. Malicious AS nodes can scrape private subscriber info (MSISDN, service settings) via the Sh interface.

4. Mg (MGCF ↔ I-CSCF)

  • Purpose: Interworking between CS networks and IMS.
  • Security Objective: Authenticate incoming calls from legacy gateways.
  • Tactical Vulnerability: Toll Fraud Gateway. Spoofing signaling from a rogue MGCF to inject free international calls into the IMS network.

5. Gm (UE ↔ P-CSCF)

  • Purpose: The primary entry point for terminal devices into IMS.
  • Security Objective: Establish the security association (IPsec) between the UE and the network core.
  • Tactical Vulnerability: Insecure AKA. Failure to enforce IPsec after the first UNAUTHORIZED challenge allows for cleartext SIP interception.

🧭 Strategic Mapping (itu-t)

InterfaceITU Recommendation3GPP SpecificationFunctional Layer
MwQ.1912.5TS 24.229Control Plane
Cx / ShQ.3402TS 29.228 / TS 29.328Data Management
GmX.1035TS 33.203Access Layer

!TIPDefensive Strategy: Always deploy Session Border Controllers (SBC) as the P-CSCF/IBCF to enforce RATE LIMITING on SIP methods and perform deep packet inspection for malformed headers.

Last UpdatedJune 5, 2026
ITU-T Navigator v4.0.0
ReferenceITU Recommendation
TELCOSEC INITIATIVEEST. 2026 // GLOBAL STANDARDS RESEARCH

Independent, non-affiliated security research project dedicated to hardening global telecommunications infrastructure through data-driven auditing.