SECTOR: SIGNALING
Security: SIP/IMS - Attack Vectors & Vulnerabilities
SIP/IMS vulnerabilities often stem from the complexity of the protocol and the reliance on IP-based transport without mandatory end-to-end encryption.
🚩 Core Attack Sequences
1. REGISTER Hijacking (SIP 401 Race)
- Vector:
REGISTERmethod. - Method: An attacker monitors the Gm interface and waits for a
401 Unauthorizedchallenge. They then inject a maliciousREGISTERwith a higherCSeqnumber before the UE can respond with the valid credentials. - Impact: Redirection of incoming calls and SMS to the attacker's terminal.
- Mitigation: Mandatory IPsec ESP (TS 33.203) established during the first registration phase.
2. P-Asserted-Identity (PAI) Spoofing
- Vector: SIP Header
P-Asserted-Identity. - Method: An attacker sends an
INVITEwith a spoofed PAI header. If the P-CSCF does not verify the header against the assigned subscriber profile, the recipient sees a trusted ID. - Impact: Trusted identity spoofing for social engineering or premium rate fraud.
- Mitigation: Identity Header Validation and stripping of unverified PAI headers at the network border (SBC).
3. Toll Fraud (INVITE Routing)
- Vector:
INVITEmethod andRouteheaders. - Method: Injecting SIP sessions using specific
Routeheaders that bypass the operator's charging Application Server (AS). - Impact: Free international call routing at the operator's expense.
- Mitigation: Strict enforcement of Service-Route headers and validation of all routing paths at the S-CSCF.
4. Media Interception (SDP Hijack)
- Vector: Session Description Protocol (SDP) in
200 OKorINVITE. - Method: Modifying the
c=(connection) andm=(media) lines in the SDP body to point to an attacker's IP during the initial handshake. - Impact: Eavesdropping or recording of voice/video calls (MITM).
- Mitigation: Use of SRTP (Secure Real-time Transport Protocol) with encrypted key exchange.
🛠️ Security Architecture Mapping
| Attack Vector | Vulnerability Source | 3GPP Reference | ITU Mapping |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reg Hijacking | Lack of encryption | TS 33.203 | X.805 (Auth) |
| ID Spoofing | Trusted Header Abuse | TS 24.229 | X.1254 |
| Toll Fraud | Routing Misconfig | TS 32.260 | E.156 |
| Call Eavesdrop | Plaintext Media | TS 33.328 | X.805 (Conf) |
!CAUTIONSIP Header Complexity: Many SIP stacks are vulnerable to memory corruption via long or specially crafted headers (e.g.,
Via,Contact). Regular fuzzing of the S-CSCF is required to prevent remote crash vulnerabilities.
Last UpdatedJune 5, 2026
ITU-T Navigator v4.0.0
ReferenceITU Recommendation